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 1 
Summary 
 
Protection from internal armed conflict is an integral part of the Common 
European Asylum System, as it has developed since the 1980s. The 
common European provisions governing such protection are found in the 
EU Qualification Directive, where they form part of what is labelled 
subsidiary protection. These provisions have been transposed into Swedish 
legislation by way of amendments to the Aliens Act in January 2010.  
Protection from internal armed conflict thus came to be governed by two 
different provisions in the Aliens Act, as the previous provision on persons 
otherwise in need of protection was kept. 
 
The question of how an internal armed conflict is to be defined is of great 
importance in applying the provisions on subsidiary protection in the 
Qualifications Directive and the Aliens Act, and it has been the subject of 
judicial review in both the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
and the Swedish Migration Court of Appeal. In a number of judgements, the 
Migration Court of Appeal has applied a definition inspired by international 
humanitarian law (IHL). The influence of IHL on the definition of internal 
armed conflict in asylum law has however been criticized because it results 
in a definition that is considered to be too narrow, and because it leaves too 
much margin of appreciation to the deciding authorities and courts. 
 
In the Diakité-judgement, delivered in January 2014, the CJEU establishes 
that, for the purpose of applying the relevant provisions of the Qualification 
Directive, it is not necessary for an internal armed conflict to characterised 
as such under IHL. Instead, the CJEU applies a less strict definition of the 
concept and establishes that the decisive factor is whether the conflict can be 
found to give rise to a serious and individual threat by reason of the 
indiscriminate violence stemming from the conflict in question. 
 
The Diakité-judgement is yet to be commented on by the Migration Court of 
Appeal in a precedent-setting decision. The Migration Court of Appeal is 
however bound by the Diakité-judgement in applying the transposed 
provision on subsidiary protection. Whether the Migration Court of Appeal 
will also use the wider definition of internal armed conflict in applying the 
provision on persons otherwise in need of protection remains to be seen. 
Hence, it is still not entirely clear how the Diakité-judgement will affect the 
interrelation between the different provisions governing protection from 
internal armed conflict in the Aliens Act. 
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Sammanfattning 
 
Skydd på grund av en inre väpnad konflikt är en del av det gemensamma 
europeiska asylsystem som varit under utveckling sedan 1980-talet. De EU-
rättsliga bestämmelser som idag reglerar sådant skydd återfinns i 
Skyddsgrundsdirektivets artiklar rörande alternativt skyddsbehövande. 
Skyddsgrundsdirektivets bestämmelser om skydd på grund av inre väpnad 
konflikt införlivades i svensk rätt genom lagändringar i Utlänningslagen 
(2005:716) som trädde i kraft i januari 2010. Skydd undan inre väpnad 
konflikt regleras sedan dess i två skilda bestämmelser i utlänningslagen, 
förutom den transponerade bestämmelsen om alternativt skyddsbehövande 
omfattar även utlänningslagens bestämmelse om skyddsbehövande i övrigt 
de som flyr inre väpnad konflikt. 
 
Frågan om hur en inre väpnad konflikt ska definieras är av stor betydelse 
vid prövning av vem som ska beredas alternativt skydd enligt 
Skyddsgrundsdirektivet och Utlänningslagen, och den har varit föremål för 
domstolsprövning i såväl EU-domstolen som Migrationsöverdomstolen. 
Migrationsöverdomstolen har i ett antal avgöranden begagnat sig av en 
definition som bär tydliga tecknen på att ha inspirerats av den internationella 
humanitära rätten. Humanitärrättens inflytande på hur begreppet inre väpnad 
konflikt definieras inom asylrätten har dock kritiserats på grund av att den 
anses leda till en för snäv definition, som därutöver lämnar stort 
tolkningsutrymme till de tillämpande myndigheterna och domstolarna. 
 
I Diakité-domen, som meddelades i januari 2014, fastslog EU-domstolen att 
det vid tillämpningen Skyddsgrundsdirektivet inte är nödvändigt att en inre 
väpnad konflikt definieras som en sådan enligt humanitärrätten för att 
direktivets skyddsbestämmelser ska vara tillämpliga. EU-domstolen 
begagnar sig istället av en mindre strikt definition och fastslår att det 
väsentliga i bedömningen är huruvida konflikten kan anses ge upphov till ett 
allvarligt och personligt hot på grund av det urskiljningslösa våld som 
konflikten ger upphov till. 
 
Diakité-domen har ännu inte aktualiserats i något praxisgrundande rättsfall i 
Migrationsöverdomstolen. I bedömningen av alternativt skyddsbehov är 
Migrationsöverdomstolen emellertid bunden av EU-domstolens avgörande i 
Diakité. Huruvida Migrationsöverdomstolen också kommer att tillämpa den 
vidare definitionen av inre väpnad konflikt vid prövning enligt 
bestämmelsen om övrigt skyddsbehövande återstår att se. Därmed kvarstår 
också frågan vilka effekter EU-domstolens avgörande kommer att ha på den 
inbördes relationen mellan utlänningslagens olika bestämmelser om skydd 
på grund av inre väpnad konflikt. 
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Abbreviations 
 
CEAS Common European Asylum System 
 
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union (prior to 
the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 
December 1
st
 2009, the court was known as ECJ) 
 
CSR51 The Geneva Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees of 28 July 1951, as supplemented by 
the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967 
 
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights, 
formally: Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 
November 1950 
 
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights 
 
ECJ European Court of Justice (after the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon on December 1
st
 
2009, the court is known as CJEU) 
 
ECRE European Council on Refugees and Exiles 
 
EU European Union 
 
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross 
 
Prop. Proposition (Government proposal) 
 
QD-04 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 
on minimum standards for the qualification and 
status of third country nationals or stateless 
persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise 
need international protection and the content of 
the protection granted (OJ 2004 L 304/12) 
 
QD-11 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 
2011 on standards for the qualification of third-
country nationals or stateless persons as 
beneficiaries of international protection, for a 
uniform status for refugees or for persons 
eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the 
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content of the protection granted (OJ 2011 L 
337/9) 
 
SFS Svensk författningssamling (Swedish Code of 
Statutes) 
 
SOU Statens offentliga utredningar (Swedish 
Government Official Reports) 
 
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
 
UtlL Utlänningslag (2005:716), Swedish Aliens Act 
(Swedish Code of Statues no. 2005:716) 
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1 Introduction  
 
In the early stages of the development of what was to be known as the 
Common European Asylum System (CEAS), the Member States and the 
institutions of the European Union saw the need of harmonisation in the 
field of asylum law. It was argued that this harmonisation needed to 
encompass not only the eligibility criteria for protection pursuant to the 
Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
1
 (the CSR51), but 
also the laws and practices through which Member States applied forms of 
protection that complemented the CSR51.  
 
Among these complementary forms of protection is the practice of offering 
protection to those fleeing the hardship of internal armed conflict, which 
thus was made an express part of the protection regime of the European 
Union through the adoption of the Qualification Directive in 2004
2
 (the QD-
04). In the ambit of what was labelled “subsidiary protection”3, the Member 
States of the Union was presented with binding provisions on who was to be 
granted protection by reason of internal armed conflict. 
 
The concept of internal armed conflict, and precisely what characterises 
such a conflict, is however not readily defined. Neither the QD-04 nor the 
Recast Qualification Directive of 2011
4
 (the QD-11) defines what is to 
constitute an internal armed conflict, and no reference is made to any other 
source of law containing a definition. In Sweden, as in a number of other 
Member States of the European Union, guidance has been sought within the 
realm of international humanitarian law (IHL). When applying the national 
provisions relevant to the protection of those fleeing internal armed conflict, 
the Swedish Migration Board and the competent courts have relied on a 
definition of the concept heavily influenced by IHL. Even though guidance 
in defining the concept can be found in IHL, the legal discipline might not 
                                                 
1
 The Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951, as 
supplemented by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967 
2
 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the 
qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as 
persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection 
granted (OJ 2004 L 304/12) 
3
 The term ”subsidiary protection” itself is not defined in the QD-04, a “person eligible for 
subsidiary protection” is however defined as “a third country national or a stateless person 
who does not qualify as a refugee but in respect of whom substantial grounds have been 
shown for believing that the person concerned […] would  face a real risk of suffering 
serious harm [consisting of] death penalty or execution; or torture or inhumane or 
degrading treatment or punishment […];or serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life 
or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal 
armed conflict” (QD-04, articles 2(e) and 15).  
4
 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 
2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as 
beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons 
eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (OJ 2011 L 
337/9) 
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be capable of presenting a clear-cut, univocal definition for the purpose of 
application in other fields of law. Consequently, studies on the 
implementation of the QD-04 have shown diverging practices among 
Member States in applying the provision on protection from internal armed 
conflict. 
 
Against this backdrop, the influence of IHL over refugee and asylum law 
has been the subject of debate in recent years, both internationally and in 
Sweden
5
. It has been questioned whether the adoption of an IHL-based 
definition of the concept of internal armed conflict is at all appropriate, and 
the content of the definition adopted has also been the subject of critical 
scrutiny. 
 
The issue came to a decisive turning point in January 2014, when the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (the CJEU) delivered its judgement in the 
Diakité-case. In its judgement, the court establishes that, for the purpose of 
applying the relevant provisions of the Qualification Directive, it is not 
decisive whether an internal armed conflict would be defined as such in 
IHL. 
 
The impact of the Diakité-judgment on Swedish asylum law is potentially 
transforming, as the concerned authorities have previously relied on an IHL-
oriented approach to the concept of internal armed conflict. At the time of 
writing, the outcome of the Diakité-judgement is still to be applied by the 
Swedish Migration Court of Appeal. The Swedish Migration Board, 
however, has concluded that the national sources of law previously used to 
determine the existence of an internal armed conflict now have to give way 
to the ruling of the CJEU. Against this backdrop, it appears relevant to 
approach the subject of how the protection from an internal armed conflicts, 
and the definition of such a conflict, has been shaped within European and 
Swedish asylum law.  
 
1.1 Subject and Purpose 
 
The subject of this thesis is the legal provisions and the case law governing 
eligibility for subsidiary and complementary
6
 protection by reason of 
internal armed conflict. The subject will be approached from a Swedish 
perspective. Thus, the material subject is the relevant Swedish legislation 
and case law, as well as the relevant provisions of the Qualification 
Directives and the related case law of the CJEU, which, through the legal 
hierarchy of the European Union, affect the Swedish sources of law. 
 
                                                 
5
 See: Storey (2012); Durieux (2012); Magnusson (2008); Stern (2010) 
6
 The term ”subsidiary protection” is used to denote both such protection as it is framed 
within EU law, as well as the corresponding protection forms introduced in national 
legislation. In contrast, the term “complementary protection” is used to denote any form of 
protection, complementary to that afforded to refugees pursuant to the CSR51. 
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The purpose of this thesis is therefore twofold; the main purpose is to map 
out the process through which the regime of subsidiary protection and 
protection from armed conflict has evolved in the European Union and in 
Sweden respectively. In doing so, this thesis analyses the impact of the 
European  process on Swedish legislation and case law, and brings the 
matter to the present point at which Swedish case law is potentially in clinch 
with the CJEU’s judgment in the Diakité-case. 
 
In the concluding section of this thesis, the further purpose is to discuss the 
possible grounds and incentives behind the CJEUs recent departure from an 
IHL-based interpretation of the concept of internal armed conflict in asylum 
law, and the implications and possible benefits or drawbacks of such an 
approach. Further, the more immediate impact of the Diakité-judgement, 
especially in Swedish asylum law and practice will be discussed.  
 
1.2 Method 
 
The first three sections of this thesis will largely rely on a legal, dogmatic 
method in that they aim to describe the relevant parts of international 
humanitarian law, EU law and Swedish law de lege lata. In doing so, focus 
will mainly be on primary sources of law, in the form of the EU 
Qualification Directives and the Swedish Aliens Act and the corresponding 
preparatory work or travaux préparatoires, as well as the case law of CJEU 
and the supreme instance in Swedish asylum law. However, legal doctrine 
will also be consulted, and at times dissenting opinions of scholars will be 
given expression in the first sections of the thesis. 
 
The concluding section of the thesis will deviate from the dogmatic method, 
partly because of the fact that not much is yet written in regards of 
protection from internal armed conflict post-Diakité, and partly because said 
section will approach the subject through a wider perspective, in analysing 
the possible effects of the Diakité-judgement and reflecting on the future 
concept of internal armed conflict, and the related forms of protection, in the 
field of asylum law.  
 
1.3 Delimitations 
 
This thesis will focus on protection from armed conflict as it has been 
framed within European Union law and Swedish Law. It lacks any 
comparative ambitions in regards of contrasting Swedish legislation and 
case law to that of other Member States. Such national legislation and case 
law will not be addressed in detail, but is occasionally mentioned where it 
has had an impact on the drafting process of EU legislation, or on the 
reasoning of the CJEU. 
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It should be noted that basic knowledge on EU law and its hierarchical 
relation to the national legislation of the Member States is presupposed, as 
this thesis will neither address the rules establishing the superiority of EU 
norms, nor the binding effects of CJEU’s preliminary rulings. 
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2 Some initial remarks on the 
concept of internal armed 
conflict 
 
As has already been implied, and as will be apparent in the coming sections 
of this thesis, the concept of internal armed conflict, and how it is defined, is 
of great importance when interpreting and applying national as well as 
international legislation relevant to subsidiary and complementary 
protection. This section will therefore present a brief presentation of the 
concept and how it is generally approached. 
 
As an outline, there seem to be a widespread view among scholars that no 
unequivocal interpretation of the concept of internal armed conflict exists 
within international law as a whole
7
. And, of greater importance to the 
material scope of this thesis, comparative studies have shown that the 
definition of internal armed conflict as applied within the framework of 
asylum law differs between Member States of the European Union
8
. 
 
It is within the field of international humanitarian law that the concept of 
internal armed conflict has its original abode, and it is also within this legal 
discipline that the need to define the concept first arose. To what extent it is 
purposive and adequate to apply that definition when assessing the need for 
international protection of those fleeing armed conflicts will be discussed 
below. 
 
Nevertheless, Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
9
 was the 
first regulation of non-international armed conflicts in black letter law
10
. 
The explicit purpose of the article is to regulate the conduct of the parties to 
conflicts not of an international character. According to an Opinion Paper 
published by the ICRC in 2008, article 3 is applicable to conflicts between 
governmental armed forces and non-governmental armed forces, as well as 
to conflicts involving only non-governmental armed forces, where the 
hostilities reach a minimum level of intensity
11
. In order for a conflict to 
exist in accordance with article 3, it needs to involve at least two 
distinguishable parties. For a non-governmental force to define as a party, it 
needs to show at least some level of organisation
12
. 
 
                                                 
7
 Bauloz (2014), p. 835; Magnusson (2008), p. 394. 
8
 See e.g. UNHCR (2007), p. 76f. 
9
 Convention (I), (II), (III) and (IV) adopted at Geneva, 12 of August 1949 
10
 Magnusson (2008), p. 385. 
11
 ICRC (2008), p. 3. 
12
 Magnusson (2008), p. 385. 
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The 1977 Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions
13
 
(Protocol II) explicitly aims to regulate non-international armed conflicts. 
According to its article 1, it “develops and supplements Article 3 common 
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its 
existing conditions of application” and applies to: 
 
all armed conflicts [..] which take place in the territory of a High 
Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or 
other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise 
such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out 
sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol. 
 
Situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and 
sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, are explicitly 
excluded from the application of Protocol II. 
 
The definition of a “non-international armed conflict” in article 1 of 
Protocol II is thus more detailed and narrower than the definition of an 
“armed conflict not of an international character”, which can be deduced 
from the common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. In this context, 
the ICRC suggests that the restrictive definition of Protocol II is only 
relevant for the application of the protocol itself, and does not extend to the 
law of non-international armed conflicts in general
14
. In other words, article 
3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions is applicable in most any internal armed 
conflict (including those covered by Protocol II), while Protocol II is only 
applicable in internal armed conflicts as defined in the Protocol. 
 
In its Opinion Paper, the ICRC concludes by proposing a definition of 
“Non-international armed conflicts” as: 
 
[…] protracted armed confrontations occurring between governmental 
armed forces and the forces of one or more armed groups, or between such 
groups, arising on the territory of a State (party to the Geneva 
Conventions). The armed confrontation must reach a minimum level of 
intensity and the parties involved in the conflict must show a minimum of 
organisation.
15
 
 
Whether this, in the view of the ICRC, is to be regarded as a definition of 
customary status is not entirely clear, it simply states that the definition 
proposed “reflect the strong prevailing legal option”16. 
 
Nevertheless, the concluding proposal offered by the ICRC is an indication 
of the evolving nature of IHL and its notion on what is to be regarded as an 
internal armed conflict. It should also be noted that, while states have 
                                                 
13
 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977. 
14
 ICRC (2008), p. 4. 
15
 ICRC (2008), p. 5. 
16
 ICRC (2008), p. 5. 
 11 
traditionally been unwilling to limit their sovereignty by regarding internal 
conflicts as subject of international law instead of as matters regarded 
strictly as domestic affairs
17
, the ICRC and the academic world have long 
made arguments for a uniform law of all armed conflicts
18
. 
 
However, without the support of states or the evidence of a changed state 
practice, such an evolution would appear distant. Nevertheless, with the 
nature of armed conflicts changing - from wars between sovereign states or 
clearly delimited liberation wars between government forces and uprising 
groups, to internal conflicts showing no distinguishable lines between state 
and non-state actors or conflict zones and safe zones - the discrepancy 
between law and reality is obvious
19
. Thus, although a “modern” definition 
of the concept of internal armed conflict is yet to be established in a 
universally accepted international norm or custom, the growing discrepancy 
might well prove to be a hotbed for a continuing evolution.  
 
In summary, no univocal notion of what is to be regarded as an internal 
armed conflict exists within international law. Within the field of IHL, 
which (as will be apparent in the later sections of this thesis) has most often 
been the source of inspiration when attempting to define the concept for the 
purpose of application within asylum law, the concept is ambiguous and in a 
potential process of evolution. The implications this might have on IHL or 
any other field of international law lies outside the scope of this thesis. For 
now, it suffices to establish that the concept of internal armed conflict is not 
easily defined, and that this, of course, has repercussions in the field of 
asylum law. 
                                                 
17
 Magnusson (2008), p. 403. 
18
 Crawford (2007), p. 462. 
19
 Magnusson (2008), p. 406. 
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3 Subsidiary Protection and 
protection from internal 
armed conflict in the 
European Union 
 
This section aims to describe how the European Union deals with subsidiary 
protection, including protection from internal armed conflict. It will give a 
brief historical overview of the emergence of the Common European 
Asylum System (CEAS), in order to put the current provisions on subsidiary 
protection in a larger context. This section further seeks to map out the 
drafting process and the material provisions on subsidiary protection of the 
Qualification Directive and the Recast Qualification directive. Before 
presenting a brief summary, this section concludes by analysing two 
important judgements from the ECJ/CJEU. 
 
3.1 The early stages of the Common 
European Asylum System 
 
The adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam
20
  in 1997 meant that the 
institutions of the European Union was, for the first time, bestowed clear 
legal competences to adopt specific measures in relation to asylum
21
.  
 
However, intergovernmental cooperation amongst European states in the 
field of asylum and immigration predates the Treaty of Amsterdam by 
decades, and the middle of the 1980s saw the emergence of a common 
European policy on asylum and immigrations
22
. Behind the dismissal of the 
notion of asylum as subject only to national legislation and policy-making 
was the emerging project of abolishing the internal EC boarders as well as 
the rising number of asylum seekers in Europe
23
. 
 
In 1990, intergovernmental cooperation led to the adoption of the Dublin 
Convention
24
, which entered into force in 1997. The Dublin Convention was 
subsequently turned into Community legislation in form of the so-called 
                                                 
20
 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the treaty on European Union, the treaties establishing 
the European Communities and certain related acts, OJ 1997 C 340/1. 
21
 Ippolito & Velluti (2011), p. 28. 
22
 Juss (2005), p. 750. 
23
 Juss (2005), p. 750. 
24
 Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum 
lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities, OJ 1997 C 254/1. 
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Dublin II Regulation
25
. The Dublin system was put in place in order to 
prevent multiple asylum applications, lodged in different Member States by 
third-country nationals seeking protection in Europe. In order to do so, the 
Dublin Convention and later the Dublin Regulation allocates responsibility 
to a single Member State to process asylum seekers entering the common 
territory, and installs mechanisms to transfer asylum seekers to the Member 
State deemed responsible.  
 
The Dublin system did not infringe on the signatory states’ sovereignty in 
interpreting or applying the CSR51 or any other international instruments 
relating to how the lodged asylum application was to be assessed. The fact 
that the interpretation of the CSR51 differed somewhat from state to state, 
led to a situation where an asylum seeker might not be recognized as a 
refugee in the state to which a Dublin transfer was intended, while the 
transferring state was bound by the non-refoulement obligation of the 
CSR51. Faced with a risk of such a potential breach, the courts of the 
United Kingdom initially refused to make Dublin transfers unless the 
asylum seekers did not risk refoulement in the state responsible under the 
Dublin system as well
26
. 
 
Hence, the Dublin system was suffering from the lack of harmonisation in 
the Member States’ national legislation on matters concerning the 
processing of asylum applications, the reception conditions for asylum 
seekers and the assessment of protection claims. This situation served as an 
impetus for further harmonisation and, eventually, a “communitarization” of 
matters relating to refugees and asylum seekers
27
. 
 
The impetus for a harmonised subsidiary protection policy for the EU was a 
note from the Danish delegation to the Council’s migration and asylum 
working parties in March 1997
28
. According to the Danish note, the foreseen 
entry into force of the Dublin Convention meant that it was important that 
asylum applicants were ensured a uniform possibility of protection 
regardless of which Member State would eventually be considered 
responsible for examining the application. The Danish delegation further 
noted that the overall assessment of an asylum application will rarely be 
concluded by a decision on the applicant’s possibility of obtaining 
protection pursuant to the CSR51 and therefore, it will often be necessary to 
consider the need for protection on another basis. Hence, the conclusion was 
that differences in the national schemes as concerns subsidiary protection 
could constitute an essential motivation for “asylum shopping”29. 
 
                                                 
25
 Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum 
application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national, OJ 2003 L 
50/1. 
26
 Goudappel & Raulus (2011), p. 4. 
27
 Goudappel & Raulus (2011) p. 4 f. 
28
 McAdam (2007), p. 53f., referring to Council document 6764/97 ASIM 52. 
29
 6764/97 ASIM 52. 
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In February 1999, the presidency of the Council noted that while there was 
no coordinated application of the international legal instruments governing 
subsidiary protection, those forms of protection were in practice growing in 
importance and in some Member States the number of third-country 
nationals permitted to stay on the basis of subsidiary protection clearly 
exceeded those to whom refugee status had been granted in accordance with 
the CSR51
30
. The efforts of the Member States to harmonise their asylum 
systems was therefore at risk of coming to nothing, with the diminishing 
importance of the CSR51 as the base for protection claims
31
. 
 
Thus, when meeting in Tampere in October 1999, the European Council 
manifested its determination to “develop the Union as an area of freedom, 
security and justice by making full use of the possibilities offered by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam”32. In doing so, the European Council agreed to work 
towards establishing a Common European Asylum System (CEAS), which 
should include, inter alia, an approximation of rules on the recognition and 
content of the refugee status, as well as measures on subsidiary forms of 
protection offering an appropriate status to any person in need of such 
protection
33
. 
 
3.2 The Treaty of Amsterdam and the 
Qualification Directive of 2004 
 
The adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam set the legal framework for a 
further communitarization of asylum matters. Article 63 of the post-
Amsterdam EC Treaty stipulated that the Council, within a period of five 
years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, should adopt 
measures on asylum in regards of criteria and mechanisms for determining 
which Member State is responsible for considering an application for 
asylum by a national of a third country, minimum standards on the reception 
of asylum seekers, minimum standards with respect to the qualification of 
nationals of third countries as refugees, and minimum standards on 
procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status. 
                                                 
30
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3.2.1 The Qualification Directive of 2004 
 
The Commission presented a proposal for a qualification directive on 12 
September 2001
34
. According to the original proposal, subsidiary protection 
should “be granted to any third country national or stateless person who 
does not qualify as a refugee […] and who, owing to a well-founded fear of 
suffering serious and unjustified harm […], has been forced to flee or to 
remain outside his or her country of origin and is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country”35. 
“Serious and unjustified harm” was defined as torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment
36
, violation of a human right, sufficiently severe to 
engage the Member State’s international obligations37, or a threat to his or 
her life, safety or freedom as a result of indiscriminate violence arising in 
situations of armed conflict, or as a result of systematic or generalised 
violations of their human rights
38
. 
 
In the final directive, as adopted 29 April 2004
39
, a person eligible for 
subsidiary protection is defined in article 2(e) as: 
 
[…] a third country national or a stateless person who does not qualify as a 
refugee but in respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown for 
believing that the person concerned, if returned to his or her country of 
origin, or in the case of a stateless person, to his or her country of former 
habitual residence, would face a real risk of suffering serious harm as 
defined in Article 15 […], and is unable, or, owing to such risk, unwilling to 
avail himself or herself of the protection of that country 
 
Serious harm, in turn, is defined in article 15 as consisting of: 
 
(a) death penalty or execution 
(b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an 
applicant in the country of origin; or 
(c) serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of 
indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed 
conflict. 
 
                                                 
34
 Proposal for a Council directive on minimum standards for the qualification and status of 
third country nationals and stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need 
international protection, COM(2001) 510 final. 
35
 COM(2001) 510 final, article 5(2). 
36
 COM(2001) 510 final, article 15(a). 
37
 COM(2001) 510 final, article 15(b). 
38
 COM(2001) 510 final, article 15(c). 
39
 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the 
qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as 
persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection 
granted, OJ 2004 L 304/12. 
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Of importance to the provision in article 15(c) is the directive’s recital 26, 
which reads: 
 
Risk to which a population of a country or a section of the population is 
generally exposed do normally not create in themselves an individual threat 
which would qualify as serious harm. 
 
Consequently, during the drafting process the prerequisites of the threat 
faced in light of indiscriminate violence evolved from an unqualified threat 
to someone’s life, safety or freedom into a threat that needs to be both 
serious and individual
40
. Most Member States supported the individual 
requirement, as it would avoid an undesired opening of the scope of article 
15(c) to entire populations fleeing generalized violence
41
. However, the 
explicit prerequisite of an individual threat raised concerns that recital 26 
and article 15(c) might prove difficult to interpret precisely because the 
indicated protection need would typically arise in situations of generalized 
violence. The UNHCR therefore urged the Member States not to adopt a 
minimalist interpretation of these provisions
42
.  
 
Nevertheless, as Teitgen-Colly notes, to understand the individual 
prerequisite as requiring a strictly individualized threat in a situation of 
armed conflict would be contrary to the concept of indiscriminate violence. 
Instead, it should be understood as a personal or individual threat in the 
sense that it is likely to give rise to a subjective fear in each person exposed 
to it
43
. In the view of the UNHCR, an interpretation that would withhold 
protection from someone merely because s/he belongs to a larger segment of 
a population would conflict with both the wording and the spirit of article 
15(c). Instead, the individual aspect of a threat should serve to remove 
persons from the scope of article 15(c) in cases where the risk of suffering 
harm by way of indiscriminate violence is merely a remote possibility, 
either because the violence is limited to a specific region in the designated 
destination country, or because the risk faced is below the real risk threshold 
in article 2(e)
44
. 
 
The individual prerequisite would eventually come under scrutiny in the 
Elgafaji-case
45
 before the ECJ. The judgement  will be analysed in 
subsection 3.5.1. 
 
Another prerequisite of Article 15(c) that caused some concern is that the 
risk of harm caused by indiscriminate violence must originate in a situation 
“of international or internal armed conflict”. Since defining an international 
armed conflict rarely raises any issues, the problematic part of the 
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prerequisite is “internal armed conflict”. In studies on the implementation of 
the QD-04, both UNHCR and ECRE noted that the prerequisite of an 
internal armed conflict was interpreted differently in the national 
jurisdictions of the Member States
46. At the time of the UNHCR’s research, 
these judicial disparities meant, for instance, that the French authorities 
assessed the then ongoing situation in Iraq as an internal armed conflict, 
while the Swedish authorities did not
47
. In part, the differences might be 
explained by the fact that the QD-04 does not itself contain a definition of 
internal armed conflict, nor does it provide explicit reference to a definition 
in any external source. However, while some Member States relied on IHL 
in applying the prerequisite of an internal armed conflict, others did not
48
. 
 
In the second CJEU
49
 -judgement that will be analysed in detail below, the 
Diakité-judgement
50
, the court made clear its view on how the notion of 
internal armed conflict is to be interpreted within the frame of EU asylum 
law.  
 
With the aforementioned uncertainty concerning some of the key concepts 
in the European Union’s subsidiary protection regime in mind, it could have 
come as no surprise that the Commission, in its Policy Plan on Asylum, 
acknowledged that the recognition of protection needs of applicants from 
the same countries varied significantly from one Member State to another 
and that this, to some extent, was due to the wording of certain provisions of 
the QD-04
51
. The Commission therefor expressed its ambition to amend the 
criteria for qualifying for international protection and stated that it, to that 
extent, might be necessary inter alia to clarify further the eligibility 
conditions for subsidiary protection. 
 
3.3 The Hague Programme 
 
During the first phase of the CEAS, all of the legal instruments envisaged 
by the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Tampere Council were adopted. Apart 
from the QD-04, the EU adopted the Temporary Protection Directive
52
, the 
Reception Conditions Directive
53
, the Dublin II Regulation
54
 and the 
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Asylum Procedures Directive
55
, all laying down minimum standards in their 
respective fields, from which the Member States cannot derogate. 
 
With all the first-phase legal instruments of the CEAS in place, the next 
multi-annual programme, the Hague Programme
56
, was adopted in 2004. 
Under the Hague Programme, the aims of the CEAS in its second phase 
were the establishment of a common asylum procedure and a uniform status 
for those who are granted asylum or subsidiary protection. Hence, the 
ambition to go beyond minimum standards in developing the CEAS was 
stressed. Further, the Commission was invited to conclude the evaluation of 
the first-phase legal instruments and to submit the second-phase instruments 
and measures to the Council and the European Parliament with a view to 
their adoption before the end of 2010. 
 
Based in part on the responses to the public consultation launched by the 
Green Paper on the future Common European Asylum System
57
, the 
Commission presented a Policy Plan on Asylum
58
 in June 2008. The Policy 
Plan notes that the first phase legislative instruments of the CEAS can be 
considered as an important achievement and form the basis on which the 
second phase must be built. It further establishes that shortcomings have 
been identified and that “it is clear that the agreed common minimum 
standards have not created the desired level playing field”59. 
 
The concerns expressed by the Commission were reiterated by the Council 
in the “European Pact on Immigration and Asylum”60 of September 2008. 
The Council observed that considerable disparities remained between the 
Member States concerning the grant of protection and the forms the 
protection takes, and considered the time right to take new initiatives to 
complete the establishment of the CEAS, and thus to offer a higher degree 
of protections.  
 
In 2008, the Commission presented proposals to recast the Dublin II 
Regulation
61
 and the Reception Conditions Directive
62
 and in 2009, it 
presented proposals to recast the Qualification Directive
63
 and the Asylum 
Procedures Directive
64
. 
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3.4 The Treaty of Lisbon and the Recast 
Qualification Directive 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon
65
 entered into force on 1 December 2009. It 
introduced the new article 78 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), according to which the Union shall develop a 
common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and temporary protection 
with a view to offering appropriate status to any third-country national 
requiring international protection and ensuring compliance with the 
principle of non-refoulement. In order to do so, the European Parliament 
and the Council, according to article 78 TFEU, shall adopt measures for a 
common European asylum system comprising, inter alia, a uniform status of 
asylum for nationals of third countries and a uniform status of subsidiary 
protection for nationals of third countries who, without obtaining European 
asylum, are in need of international protection. 
 
Shortly after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Council 
adopted the third multi-annual programme dedicated to the development of 
an area of freedom, security and justice, called the Stockholm Programme
66
. 
The Council noted that there were still significant differences between 
national provisions and their application and upheld that, in order to achieve 
a higher degree of harmonisation, the establishment of CEAS should remain 
a key policy objective for the Union. The Council further anticipated that 
common rules and a better and more coherent application of them should 
prevent or reduce secondary movement within the Union. 
 
3.4.1 The Qualification Directive of 2011 
 
The proposal for a recast Qualification Directive was presented on 21 
October 2009
67
. In the Explanatory Memorandum of the proposal, the 
Commission recalled that the need for clarification of article 15(c) had 
previously been stressed. However, in view of the interpretative guidance 
provided by the ECJ’s judgement in Elgafaji the Commission did not 
consider it necessary to amend article 15(c), with regards to the individual 
requirement
68
. In the Commission’s proposal, nothing is said about the 
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possible ambiguities that may arise in interpreting and applying the 
prerequisite of an internal armed conflict. 
 
Noting that the Commission deemed any amendments to article 15(c) 
unnecessary, ECRE concludes that issues surrounding its application 
remain, and urges Member States to refrain from applying the words “and 
individual” in article 15(c)69. ECRE also notes that the scope of article 15(c) 
is limited in that it is only applicable in situations of international or internal 
armed conflict, and argues that it should also cover situations of generalized 
violence and systematic human rights violations, which do not equate to 
armed conflict under IHL. In the same vein, the Red Cross EU Office, in its 
position paper on the recast Qualification Directive, stresses that the 
requirement of the existence of an armed conflict remains problematic, as 
the failure of national courts to interpret it correctly has resulted in a 
protection gap
70
. Hence, the Red Cross EU Office proposes that the phrase 
“in situations of international or internal armed conflict” should be deleted 
or, if kept, accompanied by an amendment to safeguard that the requirement 
is implemented and applied in conformity with relevant international law
71
. 
 
In line with the Commission’s proposal, the final version of the QD-1172 
contains no amendments to the substantive provisions governing subsidiary 
protection. The definition of a person eligible for subsidiary protection is 
now found in article 2(f) and the reservation in recital 26 has been moved to 
recital 35. The wording of these provisions, as well as the wording of article 
15, has stayed the same as in the QD-04. With regard to the new recital 10, 
which expresses an intention to “confirm the principles underlying” the QD-
04, the conclusion must be that the QD-11 should be interpreted in 
consistency with the QD-04, except where there have been amendments to 
the text
73
. Equally, the existing case law on the concept of subsidiary 
protection is still fully valid
74
. Hence, the QD-11 did not bring about any 
substantive changes to the criteria governing the qualification for subsidiary 
protection. 
 
3.5 Relevant case law of the ECJ/CJEU 
 
The ECJ/CJEU has, to date, decided on two cases of importance to the 
interpretation of article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive, namely the 
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aforementioned Elgafaji- and Diakité-cases. While the former mainly deals 
with the prerequisite of an individual threat, the latter elaborates on what is 
to be understood by the notion of an armed conflict under EU asylum law. 
The aim of this subsection is to analyse the two cases in more detail. 
 
3.5.1 The Elgafaji-case 
 
Following a referral of the Dutch Council of State for a preliminary ruling, 
the ECJ was presented with the following two questions: 
 
- Is article 15(c) of [the Directive] to be interpreted as offering 
protection only in a situation in which article 3 of the [ECHR], as 
interpreted in the case law of the [ECtHR], also has a bearing, or does 
article 15(c), in comparison with article 3 of the [ECHR], offer 
supplementary or other protection? 
 
- If article 15(c) of the Directive, in comparison with article 3 of the 
[ECHR], offers supplementary or other protection, what are the 
criteria in that case for determining whether a person who claims to 
be eligible for subsidiary protection status runs a real risk of serious 
and individual threat by reason of indiscriminate violence, within 
the terms of article 15(c) of the directive, read in conjunction 2(e) 
thereof? 
 
In addition to the Dutch referral, a number of other Member States 
presented submissions to the Court. While France and the UK held that the 
scope of article 15(c) was the same as article 3 ECHR and that the aim of 
the article was to codify the case law of the ECtHR on said article, Belgium, 
Greece and Sweden advocated a broader interpretation of article 15(c), as a 
new and autonomous instrument
75
. 
 
After establishing that article 15(c) differs in content from article 3 ECHR
76
 
and therefore must be interpreted independently
77
, the ECJ somewhat 
reformulates the question of the case at hand, and deduces that:  
 
[…] the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 15(c) of the 
Directive, in conjunction with Article 2(e) thereof, must be interpreted as 
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meaning that the existence of a serious and individual threat to the life or 
person of the applicant for subsidiary protection is subject to the condition 
that that applicant adduce evidence that he is specifically targeted by 
reason of factors particular to his circumstances. If not, the referring court 
wishes to know the criterion on the basis of which the existence of such a 
threat can be considered to be established.
78
 
 
Moving on, the Court then notes that article 15(c) refers to a general “threat 
[…] to a civilian’s life or person”, rather than to specific acts of violence, 
and that this threat is inherent in a general situation of armed conflict where 
the violence is characterised as indiscriminate. Therefore, according to the 
ECJ: 
 
[…] the term individual must be understood as covering harm to civilians 
irrespective of their identity, where the degree of violence characterising the 
armed conflict taking place - assessed by the competent national authorities 
before which an application for subsidiary protection is made, or by the 
courts of a Member State to which a decision refusing such an application is 
referred - reaches such a high level that substantial grounds are shown for 
believing that a civilian, returned to the relevant country or […] region, 
would, solely on account of his presence […] face a real risk of being 
subject to the serious threat referred in article 15(c)
79
.  
 
With regards to the interaction of recital 26 and article 15(c), the ECJ 
establishes that the recital implies that the objective finding alone of a risk 
linked to the general situation in a country is not, as a rule, sufficient to 
satisfy the prerequisites of article 15(c), but that the wording of the recital 
allows for the possibility of an exceptional situation which would be 
characterised by such a high degree of risk that substantial grounds would 
be shown for believing that a person would be subject to the risk in 
question
80
. Further, the Court states that:  
 
[…] the more an applicant is able to show that he is specifically affected by 
reason of factors particular to his personal circumstances, the lower the 
level of indiscriminate violence required for him to be eligible for subsidiary 
protection
81
. 
 
Hence, the ECJ, in the Elgafaji-case, establishes a sliding-scale-approach to 
the two terms “individual threat” and “indiscriminate violence”, where, in 
exceptional cases, the intensity of violence in the designated destination 
country or region would in and of itself give rise to a need for subsidiary 
protection, while, in cases of less intense violence, an applicant would have 
to show an increasing level of circumstances putting him or her specifically 
at risk in order to be eligible for subsidiary protection. In that sense, the 
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protection provided by article 15(c) can be said to cover risks, which are 
situational rather than individual
82
. 
  
3.5.2 The Diakité-case 
 
As mentioned above, the view on whether or not to apply an IHL-based 
definition when interpreting article 15(c) was, at the time of Diakité’s 
commencement, incoherent among the Member States. This incoherency is 
reflected in the Member States’ submissions as noted in the Opinion of the 
Advocate General. The Government of the UK submits the opinion that the 
concept of an internal armed conflict should be given a wide and 
independent interpretation. Belgium and Germany are of the opinion that the 
concept should primarily be interpreted in accordance with IHL, but that the 
objective of protection of the QD, in exceptional cases, might render it 
necessary to admit the existence of an internal armed conflict, for the 
purpose of applying article 15(c), even if all conditions would not be 
fulfilled according to IHL
83
. 
 
In the Diakité-case, the questions posed to the CJEU by the referring Court 
(the Belgian Council of State) were: 
 
- Must Article 15(c) of [the Directive] be interpreted as meaning that 
that provision offers protection only in a situation of “internal 
armed conflict”, as interpreted by international humanitarian law, 
and, in particular, by reference to Common Article 3 of the four 
Geneva Conventions […]? 
 
- If the concept of “internal armed conflict” referred to in Article 
15(c) of [the Directive] is to be given an interpretation independent 
of Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions […], what, in 
that case, are the criteria for determining whether such an “internal 
armed conflict” exists? 
 
By first noting that the phrase applied in the QD-11 (“internal armed 
conflict”) differs from that used in IHL (“armed conflict not of an 
international character”)84, the CJEU proceeds by establishing:  
 
that the EU legislature wished to grant subsidiary protection not only to 
persons affected by “international armed conflict” and by “armed conflicts 
not of an international character”, as defined in [IHL], but also to persons 
affected by internal armed conflicts, provided that such conflicts involves 
indiscriminate violence.
85
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Further, the CJEU points out that IHL, in its use of the term “armed conflict 
not of an international character”, pursues different aims and establishes 
distinct protection mechanisms in comparison with the subsidiary protection 
regime of the EU
86
. Consequently, the Court finds that: it is not possible 
[…] to make subsidiary protection conditional upon finding that the 
conditions for applying [IHL] have been met
87
. 
 
Regarding the second question posed by the referring court, the CJEU 
establishes that the term internal armed conflict, for the purpose of applying 
article 15(c), must be determined by considering its usual meaning in 
everyday language, which, according to the Court, is a situation in which a 
State’s armed forces confront one or more armed groups or in which two or 
more armed groups confront each other
88
.  
 
Since the decisive element of article 15(c) is the existence of a serious and 
individual threat by reason of indiscriminate violence
89
, the application of 
the article must not be made conditional upon the level of organisation of 
the armed forces involved in the conflict or the duration of the conflict, as 
long as the confrontations evoke such a threat
90
.  
 
In sum, the CJEU rules: 
 
On a proper construction of Article 15(c) of [QD-11], it must be 
acknowledged that an internal armed conflict exists, for the purposes of 
applying that provision, if a State’s armed forces confront one or more 
armed groups or if two or more armed groups confront each other. It is not 
necessary for that conflict to be categorised as ‘armed conflict not of an 
international character’ under international humanitarian law; nor is it 
necessary to carry out, in addition to an appraisal of the level of violence 
present in the territory concerned, a separate assessment of the intensity of 
the armed confrontations, the level of organisation of the armed forces 
involved or the duration of the conflict
91
. 
 
3.6 Summarising protection from internal 
armed conflict under the Qualification 
Directive 
 
Before moving on to the section mapping out the evolution of Swedish 
legislation and case law relevant to protection from armed conflict, a brief 
conclusion of the protection regime of the EU is in place. 
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As described above, the institutions and the Member States of the EU saw 
the need to harmonise legislation on the assessment of asylum applications 
in the wake of the creation of the Dublin system. Seeing that considerable 
numbers of those seeking asylum within the Union did not qualify for, or 
did not expressly apply for, protection as refugees under the CSR51, the 
harmonisation needed to include legislation addressing subsidiary forms of 
protection. 
 
In response, the Qualification Directive was drafted and adopted, as the first 
supranational instrument to deal with protection complementary, or 
subsidiary, to that afforded by the CSR51
92
. The QD comprises criteria for 
assessing the protection needs of those risking harm consisting of serious 
and individual threat by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of 
international or internal armed conflict. These provisions, governing 
protection from armed conflict, has been subject of interpretation by the 
ECJ/CJEU, whereby the Court has established that the level of 
individualisation required for a protection need to exist is to be assessed by 
ways of a sliding-scale-approach comprising an estimation of the intensity 
of the indiscriminate violence taking place in the designated destination 
country or region. The Court has further established that, in order for 
subsidiary protection need to exist in accordance with the QD, it is not 
necessary to establish that the internal armed conflict, in which the 
indiscriminate violence is taking place, would be recognised as an “armed 
conflict not of an international character” under IHL. 
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4 Protection from internal 
armed conflict in Swedish 
legislation 
 
This section will analyse Swedish legislation and case law governing 
protection from internal armed conflict. It will first seek the legislative 
origins of said protection and trace the provisions into the current Aliens 
Act and in subsequent amendments. In doing so, it will inevitably touch 
upon the impact of article 15(c) of the QD in Swedish legislation. Further, 
this section will analyse Swedish case law of relevance to the protection 
afforded those fleeing internal armed conflict, and also highlight the impact 
of the aforementioned judgements from the CJEU. Finally, it will comment 
on the impact of the Diakité-judgement on the application of the national 
provisions on protection from internal armed conflict.  
 
4.1 Legislation and case law prior to the 
transposition of the Qualification 
Directive 
 
Up until 1997, when the concept of internal armed conflict was introduced 
as an explicit ground for protection in the Swedish Aliens Act through an 
amendment to the former Aliens Act of 1989
93
, those forced to leave their 
country of origin due to ongoing armed conflicts were granted residence 
permits on politico-humanitarian grounds. According to the travaux 
préparatoires to the Aliens Act of 1989, the politico-humanitarian grounds 
for residence permit were applicable inter alia to persons to whom the 
provisions on asylum did not apply, but where the conditions in the 
designated destination country, e.g. because of an ongoing war, were such 
that it appeared inhumane to force someone to return
94
. 
 
In the travaux préparatoires to the amendments of 1997, the Government 
notes that the incomparably largest category of persons permitted to stay in 
Sweden on any kind of refugee related grounds was, at the time, made up of 
those fleeing war and civil war
95
. The Government held that the protection 
need in such cases was strong, and that it was urgent that this category was 
explicitly incorporated in a new provision on protection
96
. Thus, the concept 
of “persons otherwise in need of protection” was introduced in the Aliens 
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Act, comprising, inter alia, aliens who, without qualifying for protection as 
refugees, were in need of protection because of an external or internal armed 
conflict. The provision on protection from armed conflict was said to 
essentially constitute a codification of a very firm and clear case law
97
. 
However, neither the travaux préparatoires nor the provisions themselves 
provided any definition on what is to constitute an internal armed conflict, 
nor did they refer to any relevant international instrument
98
. 
 
In 2004, the Government, acting as the supreme instance of appeals under 
the Aliens Act of 1989, when deciding upon an application for protection by 
two Russian citizens of Chechnyan origin, came to the following conclusion 
on what was to be understood by the concept of internal armed conflict in 
the Aliens Act: 
 
In international law, an internal armed conflict is characterised by strife 
between a state’s armed forces and other organised armed groups. This 
strife must be of such a character that it goes beyond what can be classified 
as internal disturbances or sporadic and isolated acts of violence. 
Furthermore, the armed groups must have some level of territorial control, 
which allows them to perform military operations. The current provision on 
protection in the Aliens Act was enacted against the backdrop of the influx 
of refugees from conflict areas during the first half of the 1990s. In applying 
the current provision, there is a margin for both a narrower and a wider 
interpretation of the concept of internal armed conflict than the one 
stipulated by international law. A decisive factor in interpreting the concept 
when applying the provision of the Aliens Act must be, inter alia, how the 
civilian population is affected. The conflict might be of such intensity that a 
return to the part of the country in which the applicant formerly resided 
appears unthinkable, while at the same time, a return to any other part of 
the country is impossible
99
. 
 
The impact on the provision on protection from internal armed conflict by 
the introduction of the current Aliens Act
100
 was mainly editorial. The 
section on persons otherwise in need of protection was moved to a new 
chapter titled “Refugees and persons otherwise in need of protection” and 
was amended to also encompass aliens who, due to “other severe conflicts” 
in the country of origin, have a well-founded fear of serious abuse. The 
concept of severe conflicts was to be understood as, inter alia, political 
instability in the country of origin, where the power structures are such that 
the legal system does not impartially protect the fundamental human rights 
of the population. The provision encompasses conflicts between different 
groups in the population, between one group in the population and the 
government, or between the government or a group in the population on the 
one hand and another government on the other, where the conflict has not 
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reached such a level that it could be said to constitute an armed conflict
101
. 
The term serious abuse was, in the travaux préparatoires, exemplified as 
encompassing reprisals, abuse of law and harassments
102
. Thus, the 
provision on other severe conflicts set a lower standard in regard of the 
intensity of the conflict. Protection under the provision is however made 
conditional on a well-founded fear and on serious abuses as well as the 
existence of a nexus between the conflict and the possible abuse. The 
definition of what constitutes serious abuse is interpreted to be broader than 
how the QD defines serious threat in regard to the type of human rights 
violation and the level of seriousness of the violation
103
. 
 
In a precedent-setting decision by the Migration Court of Appeal (which by 
then had replaced the Government as the supreme instance of appeals) in 
2007, the aforementioned definition of the concept of internal armed 
conflict set out in Reg. 99-04 was reaffirmed, with the exception of the 
phrase “In applying the current provision, there is a margin for both a 
narrower and a wider interpretation of the concept of internal armed 
conflict than the one stipulated by international law”104.  
 
Just like the definition of an internal armed conflict applied in Reg. 99-04, 
the definition in MIG 2007:9 seem to draw guidance from the 1977 
Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions
105
, in that it requires 
governmental involvement as well as territorial control on behalf of the 
opposing armed groups. Furthermore, it combines these requirements with 
an estimation of the effect on the civilian population, thus adoption a 
domestic interpretation of the concept of internal armed conflict that is even 
narrower than the one found in Protocol II
106
. This approach has been 
criticised in the sense that the estimation of the effects on the civil 
population should rightly form part of the assessment of alleged protection 
needs, and not in determining whether an internal armed conflict is in 
occurrence
107
. Further, the decision was criticised in that it drew guidance 
from the narrow definition of the concept of internal armed conflict in 
Protocol II, leaving the common article 3
108
 uncommented
109
. 
 
In a judgement adjudicated on October 6
th
 2009, only two days before the 
Government proposal regarding the transposition of the Qualification 
Directive into Swedish legislation was presented to the Swedish Riksdag
110
, 
the Migration Court of Appeal saw reason to once more return to the 
concept of internal armed conflict and its application in Swedish 
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legislation
111
. The impetus for the renewed judicial review in the Migration 
Court of Appeal was three judgements concerning single male asylum 
seekers from the Somali capital Mogadishu, two adjudicated by the 
Migration Court in Stockholm and the third by the Migration Court in 
Gothenburg. Whereas the court in Gothenburg found that the situation in 
Mogadishu at the time amounted to an internal armed conflict, the court in 
Stockholm did not
112
. 
 
After initially establishing, in stark contrast with its previous judgement in 
MIG 2007:9, that a univocal definition of the concept of internal armed 
conflict is hardly to be found in international law, the Migration Court of 
Appeal, in light of reports on the lack of a functioning government structure 
in parts of Somalia and the severe hardship that had befallen the civilian 
population during nearly two decades, found reason to reconsider the 
previous interpretation presented by the same court. It further held it 
possible that the concept ought to be given a different and wider meaning. 
 
After a brief review of the relevant international instruments, as well as case 
law and doctrine, the court concluded that the requirement of territorial 
control, as expressed in Protocol II, could not be decisive in determining 
whether an internal armed conflict is at hand. The court further concluded 
that neither could the involvement of governmental armed forces be seen as 
a prerequisite for the existence of an internal armed conflict. 
 
It is instead the opinion of the Migration Court of Appeal, that an internal 
armed conflict exists, for the purpose of applying the Aliens Act, when the 
following conditions are met: 
 
The severe conflicts encompasses prolonged and ongoing strife between a 
state’s armed forces and one or more organised armed groups, or between 
two or more such groups fighting each other. The strife is of such a 
character that it goes beyond what can be classified as internal 
disturbances or sporadic and isolated acts of violence. It is characteristic 
for the situation of the civilian population, that the violence caused by the 
conflict is indiscriminate and so severe that substantial grounds are shown 
for believing that a civilian would, solely on account his or her presence, 
face a serious and individual threat to life or person. 
 
As indicated above, the Qualification Directive had not been formally 
transposed into Swedish legislation at the time of the judgement in MIG 
2009:27. Nevertheless, by the wording of the court, it is obvious that it drew 
inspiration from articles 2(e) and 15(c) of QD-04, as well as from common 
article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 in defining the concept of 
internal armed conflict. The result is a broader and more inclusive 
interpretation than the one found in MIG 2007:9
113
. However, by the 
wording of the judgement it cannot be entirely ascertained whether the 
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confusion between the assessment of what is to be considered an internal 
armed conflict and the assessment of who is to be considered in need of 
protection because of that conflict, as manifested in MIG 2007:9, persists or 
not
114
. 
 
No precedent-setting judgement of later date has hence altered the definition 
contained in MIG 2009:27, which thus still holds precedence, at least in 
terms of domestic sources of law. The impact of the aforementioned 
Diakité-judgement will be discussed below. 
 
4.2 The transposition of the Qualification 
Directive and the Recast Qualification 
Directive 
 
The QD-04 was transposed into Swedish legislation on January 1
st
 2010
115
. 
Through the amendments made, the Aliens Act adopted the concept of 
“subsidiary protection” and the corresponding ground for protection was 
introduced in UtlL 4:2§ (chapter 4, section 2), which had previously 
contained the provisions governing the protection ground for persons 
“otherwise in need of protection”. The latter protection ground was however 
retained, but moved to a new section and is now to be found in UtlL 4:2a§. 
 
The government held that the criteria for determining who is to be 
recognised as a person eligible for subsidiary protection had to be uniform 
in every Member State of the EU, since those criteria form part of the 
concept “beneficiaries of international protection”, which is a generic term 
within Union Law
116
. Since the domestic concept of “person otherwise in 
need of protection” was deemed to be wider than the Directives concept of 
“person eligible for subsidiary protection”, the Government ruled out the 
possibility of transposing article 15 of the QD by simply relabeling UtlL 
4:2§ and adding to that provision the prerequisites it lacked to be in 
conformity with article 15
117
, as had been suggested by the Commission of 
Inquiry assessing the transposition
118
. 
 
The conclusion that the concept a “person eligible for subsidiary protection” 
is narrower that of a “person otherwise in need of protection” is reached 
with reference to the way in which the protection need of those fleeing 
armed conflict is framed. While the QD sets out to protect a civilian who 
would face a real risk of suffering serious and individual threat to life or 
person by reason of indiscriminate violence, the thus far applicable 
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provision of the Aliens Act plainly protected those in need of protection by 
reason of an armed conflict, without any individualised risk assessment
119
. 
 
However, recalling the Elgafaji-judgement, one could probably argue that 
the sliding scale-approach introduced by the CJEU nullifies the added value 
of UtlL 4:2a §, at least in terms of risk assessment, since it was established 
by the court that there is no absolute requirement of an individualised risk 
for a subsidiary protection need to exist, thus diminishing that prerequisite 
in the application of UtlL 4:2 §
120
. Still, differences remain in that the 
provision on subsidiary protection explicitly requires that the threat to life of 
person emanates from a situation of indiscriminate violence (though this 
requirement is also subject to the sliding scale-approach introduced by the 
Elgafaji-judgement), and in that it only offers protection to civilians. 
 
The QD-11 has not yet been transposed into Swedish legislation, although 
this should have been done by December 21
st
 2013
121
. A Government 
proposal was presented to the Swedish Riksdag on August 28
th
 2014, with 
amendments proposed to take effect by January 1
st
 2015
122
.  
 
As noted above, the QD-11 did not bring about any substantive changes on 
the provisions relevant for determining who is eligible for subsidiary 
protection because of flight from internal armed conflicts. Consequently, the 
amendments proposed to UtlL 4:2 § and 4:2a § relate to the actors of serious 
harm and the actors of protection, and do not otherwise alter the provisions 
on what is to be considered an internal armed conflict or who is to be 
considered in need of protection because of said conflict
123
. 
 
4.3 Relating Swedish legislation and 
practice to the Diakité-judgement 
 
As already established above, the definition of the concept internal armed 
conflict set by the Migration Court of Appeal in its judgement MIG 
2009:27, is to date the most recent definition construed by the court, and it 
was, at least up until the Diakité-judgement, given authoritative meaning in 
applying the relevant provisions of the Aliens Act
124
. 
 
However, the definition enshrined in MIG 2009:27 cannot be said to be in 
conformity with the judgement of the CJEU in the Diakité-case. In a 
Judicial Position published on April 24
th
 2014 by the Swedish Migration 
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Board
125
, the acting Director of Legal Affairs states that, although the 
provisions in and the wording of UtlL 4:2 § is not in breach of article 15 (c) 
of the Qualification Directive, the statements of the travaux préparatoires 
and the previous case law of the Migration Court of Appeal must give way 
to the case law of the CJEU in applying the domestic provision. 
 
The impact of the Diakité-judgement will be further discussed in the final 
section of this thesis. 
 
4.4 Summarising protection from internal 
armed conflict in Swedish legislation 
 
The practise of granting residence permits to persons fleeing armed conflict 
was well established prior to the introduction of the concept of internal 
armed conflict in Swedish legislation. However, up until amendments were 
made in the Aliens Act in 1997, this was done without reference to any legal 
right to protection. Instead, residence permits was granted on politico-
humanitarian grounds. 
 
The year 1997 saw the introduction of the concept “persons otherwise in 
need of protection”, which constituted a protection ground for, inter alia, 
persons in need of such because of an external or internal armed conflict. 
Neither the provisions themselves nor the travaux préparatoires did 
however offer any definition of the concept of internal armed conflict to be 
applied.  
 
Such definition has instead evolved within the case law of the supreme 
instance in Swedish asylum law. In a precedence-setting judgement from 
2004, reiterated in 2007, a narrow and IHL-oriented definition was set, 
requiring both governmental involvement and territorial control on behalf of 
the opposing armed groups. These judgements has been criticised in that 
they lean excessively on the definition of a non-international conflict in the 
1977 Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and in that 
they further restrict that definition by incorporating an estimation of the 
effect on the civilian population in determining whether a situation is to be 
defined as an internal armed conflict. By doing so, the court has been said to 
mix the assessment of the situation at hand with the assessment of the 
protection needs of those fleeing.  
 
In a judgement from 2009, the Migration Court of Appeal altered the 
definition previously set by the same court, and established that the 
requirement of territorial control and the involvement of governmental 
armed forces should not be regarded as decisive in determining whether an 
armed conflict is at hand, for the purpose of applying the relevant provisions 
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of the Aliens Act. Thus, the court widened the definition but maintained an 
IHL-oriented approach in that it drew inspiration from the Common Article 
3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The alleged confusion between the 
assessment of the conflict at hand, and the protection needs of those affected 
appears to remain in the reasoning of the court.  
 
Through the transposition of the Qualification Directive and the introduction 
of the concept of subsidiary protection, two separate provisions on 
protection from internal armed conflict came to coexist in the Aliens Act. 
Although the scope of the strictly domestic provision on persons otherwise 
in need of protection has been said to be wider, the judgements of the CJEU 
in the Elgafaji- and Diakité-cases have broadened the scope of article 15(c) 
of the Qualification Directive, and thus the scope of the provision on 
subsidiary protection in the Aliens Act. 
 
 34 
5 Reflections on the impact of 
Diakité, and the future 
protection from internal 
armed conflict 
 
The purpose of this section, as set out in the introduction of the thesis, is to 
analyse and discuss the consequences of the Diakité-judgement, and the 
clear departure from an IHL-based definition of the concept of internal 
armed conflict, which it manifests. The immediate impact on Swedish 
asylum law and practice will be given specific attention. 
 
5.1 Opinions on the departure from an 
IHL-based approach 
 
The wording of the Diakité-judgement clearly marks the CJEU’s ambition 
to guide the national authorities and courts applying the transposed 
provision of QD-11 away from an IHL-based definition. At the same time, it 
presents a definition of internal armed conflict that does not intertwine the 
assessment of the conflict with its effects. Instead, the further characteristics 
of the conflict and its effects would form part of the sliding-scale approach 
to the prerequisites of indiscriminate violence and individual risk, as set out 
in the Elgafaji-judgement
126
. 
 
However, in regards of how an internal armed conflict is to be defined, 
arguments have also been raised in favour of an IHL-oriented approach. For 
instance, Storey has argued that, in interpreting the QD, IHL should be 
applied as lex specialis, or at least as a starting point, whenever the subject-
matter is armed conflict
127
. The reason behind this argument seems to be 
that, in lacking a common, basic outline of a definition, and with nothing to 
put in its place, national decision-makers and courts would be encouraged to 
make up their own definitions
128
. This would, it was further argued, 
counteract the objective of preventing asylum-shopping as set out in the QD 
and in the CEAS as a whole
129
.  
 
After the judgement in the Diakité-case, the CJEU has attracted critique in 
that it, by creating an autonomous definition of the concept of internal 
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armed conflict, will impinge on the coherence and cohesion of the 
international legal order
130
. 
 
However, in contestation of the critique against an autonomous definition, it 
could be worthwhile to recall parts of the court’s reasoning in the Diakité-
judgement and that of the Advocate General in his Opinion, wherein it is 
argued that IHL, on the one hand, and the subsidiary protection regime 
introduced by the QD, on the other, pursue different aims and establish 
distinct protection mechanisms
131
. While IHL is designed, inter alia, to 
provide for protection for civilian populations in a conflict zone by 
restricting the effects of war, it does not provide for international protection 
to be granted to certain civilians who are outside both the conflict zone and 
the territory of the conflicting parties
132
. Consequently, the definition of an 
“armed conflict not of an international character” and of a “non-
international armed conflict” found within IHL have not been chiselled with 
the purpose of identifying situations which may give rise to the need of 
protection under asylum law.  
 
In essence then, it could be said that two opposing interests, or objectives, 
has been advocated as to whether or not to apply an IHL-based definition of 
the concept of internal armed conflict for the purpose of establish the 
protection need of those fleeing such conflict. On the one hand is the 
interest of coherency within the field of international law, and the 
predictability expected to come from a definition rooted in common 
international legal norms and customs. On the other hand is the emphasising 
of a purposive application of the QD, with the overarching ambition to offer 
protection to those in need. 
 
However, as has been mentioned in a previous section of this thesis, the 
concept of internal armed conflict, as framed within IHL, is not univocal or 
permanently defined. The implications of this can be exemplified by the 
shifting definition of the concept as manifested by the aforementioned 
judgements from the Swedish Migration Court of Appeal. It would therefore 
appear somewhat precipitous to expect an IHL-based definition to offer 
predictability as to the application of the concept within asylum law.  
 
It could further be argued that, within the realm of asylum law, the concept 
of internal armed conflict should essentially be considered as a term used to 
describe a situation, which may give rise to a protection need among those 
affected by it. If the purpose of the protection regime put in place by the 
CEAS, the Qualification Directives, and the Swedish Aliens Act, is in fact 
the offering of protection to those genuinely in need of it, the pragmatic 
approach to the concept of internal armed conflict applied in the Diakité-
judgement would seem like a reasonable step towards achieving that 
purpose. 
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5.2 Internal armed conflict in Swedish law 
and practice in light of the 
jurisprucence of the CJEU  
 
From a Swedish perspective, the Diakité-judgement marks a clear shift in 
the application of the domestic provisions on subsidiary protection and on 
persons otherwise in need of protection. The competent authorities have 
previously relied on a definition of internal armed conflict, established in 
the Migration Court of Appeal judgement MIG 2009:27, which clearly drew 
inspiration from IHL.  
 
The Migration Court of Appeal has yet to apply the criteria set out in 
Diakité, but for some commentators, the prospect of the diminishing 
importance of the previous precedent in MIG 2009:27 would clearly be 
regarded as a welcome development. While Magnusson has argued that the 
definition of internal armed conflict as interpreted by the Migration Court of 
Appeal is incoherent and inadequate because it is based on the unclear and 
anachronistic concept of internal armed conflict in IHL
133
, Stern has 
expressed concerns in regards of the way the Migration Court of Appeals 
appears to confuse the assessment of the conflict at hand, and the protection 
needs of those affected
134
. Whatever the core of the critique, it is obvious 
that the definition established in MIG 2009:27 has lost a great deal of its 
former authority as precedent.  
 
Since the outcome of the Diakité-judgement has not yet been part of the 
reasoning in any precedent-setting judgement of the Migration Court of 
Appeal, it is however unclear how, in detail, the court will relate to the 
definition of internal armed conflict set in Diakité. It is obvious that the 
Migration Court of Appeal will no longer be able resort to an IHL-based 
definition, at least not in applying the provisions on subsidiary protection. 
Whether the Diakité-judgement will also remedy the alleged confusion as 
pointed out by Stern, remains to be seen. The wording of the judgement 
does however seem to pave way for a less confused definition, in that it only 
explicitly requires an appraisal of the level of violence present in the 
concerned territory and dismisses any further assessments of the intensity of 
the armed confrontations or the duration of the conflict. The appraisal of the 
level of violence is presumably expressly mentioned in the judgement with 
reference to the prerequisite of indiscriminate violence. In theory then, the 
Migration Court of Appeal would, in order to assess an alleged need for 
subsidiary protection, only need to establish the existence of armed 
confrontations and a level of violence that meets the criteria set out in 
Elgafaji. 
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The immediate influence of the Diakité-judgement on the application of the 
transposed provision on subsidiary protection in UtlL 4:2 § is obvious. 
Whether the definition of an internal armed conflict established in Diakité 
will also be adopted in applying the provision in UtlL 4:2a §, on persons 
otherwise in need of protection, remains to been seen. However, as there is 
nothing in the travaux préparatoires of the Aliens Act indicating an 
intention on behalf of the legislator to apply different definitions to the 
concept of internal armed conflict in the two provisions, it could probably 
be assumed that the definition set in the Diakité-judgement will also be 
considered relevant when applying the domestic protection ground. The 
aforementioned Judicial Position implies that the Swedish Migration Board 
is of the opinion that the definition of the Diakité-judgement should also be 
applied when assessing the protection needs of persons otherwise in need of 
protection
135
. 
 
It is obvious that the recent jurisprudence from the CJEU on the application 
of article 15(c) of the QD has somewhat blurred the lines between the 
provisions on protection from internal armed conflict in the Aliens Act.  
Following the Elgafaji-judgment, Feijen questioned whether it was 
necessary to maintain the protection ground on internal armed conflict as 
enshrined in the provision on persons otherwise in need of protection, since 
the Elgafaji- judgment established that there is no requirement for a strictly 
individualised threat in the assessment of a subsidiary protection need
136
.  
Thus, one of the main differences, as identified in the travaux préparatoires, 
between protection from internal armed conflict under UtlL 4:2 § and UtlL 
4:2a § was made largely irrelevant. However, other differences do remain 
and are hitherto unaffected by the case law of the CJEU. The burden of 
proof must still be considered to be lower in the domestic provision on 
protection from internal armed conflict in UtlL 4:2a §. Further, the 
protection enshrined in the provision on persons otherwise in need of 
protection is not restricted to civilians, as is the transposed provision on 
subsidiary protection in UtlL 4:2 §. Hence, there would still appear to be 
some added value in the protection from internal armed conflict as provided 
by the provision on persons otherwise in need of protection. 
 
The Diakité-judgement will most likely have the additional effect of 
narrowing the gap between what, according to the Aliens Act, is to be 
considered internal armed conflicts on the one hand, and other severe 
conflicts on the other. Through the extended scope of the provisions on 
protection from internal armed conflict, the importance of the provision on 
protection by reason of other severe conflicts in UtlL 4:2a § would seem to 
wither, as an increasing number of asylum seekers could be expected to 
qualify for subsidiary protection. 
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